The chaos in Europe has triggered a well-known feeling in Germany.
It seems that Germany can currently rely neither on the East nor on the West, but only on itself. This has consequences.
US President Donald Trump is not a man of delicacy, but of roughness. However, wise foreign policy forces the statesman to move in shades of gray. One must always leave open the possibility of influencing both friend and foe for one's own aims.
The strategic goal of the USA is to concentrate on Asia, to make Russia at least neutral through peace in Ukraine and to secure its influence over Europe. When a state realigns its foreign policy interests, it makes sure that the transitions are not abrupt so as not to shake the trust of its allies. One takes one's allies with one so that they see for themselves that there is no alternative to this about-turn in the interests of the alliance. Trump has completely renounced this. Instead of a transition in this direction, there was a seamless break with Europe.
Merz's billions-euro investments are a turning point
First, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made public concessions to Russia and declared that future peace in Ukraine would have to be secured not by American but by European troops. The Europeans, who themselves provide Ukraine with a great deal of support, felt offended by the unilateral approach, but were still able to digest it. J.D. Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference, Trump's description of Zelensky as a dictator and the accusation that Ukraine itself had triggered the war were the final straw for the Europeans, especially Germany.
„My absolute priority is that the Europeans come to an agreement and agree (...) to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we can achieve independence from the USA step by step”, said Friedrich Merz on television on election night as the chairman of Germany's largest party, which has historically almost never left the side of the USA. At the latest after Donald Trump's statements last week, it is obvious that the USA is currently indifferent to the fate of Europe. „I am curious to see, when we approach the NATO summit in June, whether we will still be talking about NATO in its current form or whether we will have to establish an independent European defense much sooner.”
A few days later, namely on March 4 - the chronology is extremely important here - Friedrich Merz announced, contrary to all budgetary convictions, that he wanted to invest hundreds of billions of euros in infrastructure and armaments. This is a turning point in German history that was not recognized in Washington, but was in Europe.
Old patterns break open in Europe
Where the power of the US used to mask the different national interests in Europe because there was leadership and security from Washington, Trump's announcement has caused old tensions to flare up. Animosity arose between London and Paris when London ignored concrete French ideas about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. Probably the most significant of these tensions is the one between Berlin and Paris.
Even before Friedrich Merz was elected German Chancellor, Emmanuel Macron gave a speech on European security on March 6, two days after Merz's announcement of Germany's unprecedented rearmament: „We have the most powerful army and the most powerful military in all of Europe. (...) Our nuclear capability gives us a certain position that is different from that of our neighbors.“ France's nuclear deterrent has always played an essential role in ensuring peace and security in Europe. In order to cooperate with a new German chancellor, however, it would be necessary to ensure „that this deterrent applies to all European allies. Whatever the decision on the use of nuclear deterrence, it will always be in the hands of the French president and the head of the armed forces.“
Merz still believes, as he emphasized on election night, that he can Europeanize Germany's security policy in such a way that its neighbors need not fear the arming colossus in the middle of the continent. If history plays a role in the fate of nations, then he will not succeed.
Of six joint armaments projects, Germany and France have canceled five in recent years and the sixth is on the brink. They can neither agree on which country and company will receive which share of the new armaments project, nor how the armaments product should be designed with which specific characteristics. Both sides are saying that they could also produce on their own, cooperate with other countries or buy their armaments. In view of all this, how can we agree on a joint nuclear umbrella in which the French president alone decides whether he wants to risk Paris for Berlin in the last resort? How can Germany rely on this?
Kissinger proved Adenauer's doubts right
Even during the Cold War, when Europe was still the most important world stage, Konrad Adenauer doubted that the USA would defend Germany with nuclear weapons. After leaving office, Henry Kissinger said that the USA would not have done so, thus proving Adenauer's concerns right. In view of all this, no power, not even the German one, would place its existence in the hands of its most important continental competitor.
If Berlin did so, Paris would have the greatest means of putting pressure on Berlin in all matters of national interest - apart from all the domestic political instability in France. French nuclear weapons in Germany would be tantamount to self-abandonment. What has triggered this chaos in Europe as a whole is Germany's old historical feeling of being in the middle of the continent and not being able to rely on either the East or the West, but only on itself. Berlin already senses this, but doesn't want to see reality that way yet, wants to Europeanize its security so as not to offend anyone.
However, this will gradually change because Germany will realize in the European negotiations at the latest that each country is pursuing its own national interests first and wants to curb Germany's influence. This should also open Berlin's eyes.
Muamer Bećirović researches the history of diplomacy and international politics. In April 2024, he published a biography of the Austrian diplomat and statesman of the post-Napoleonic era, Prince Klemens von Metternich.
This piece was first published in the Berliner Zeitung on the 25.03.2025
Foto credit: Katherine Young, New York